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THE FUNDING EFFECT IN SCIENCE AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE JUDICIARY
Sheldon Krimsky, Ph.D.*
INTRODUCTION
Public policies and legal decisions implemented during the
1980s have created new incentives for universities, publiclysupported nonprofit institutes, and their faculties to commercialize
scientific and medical research. Academic-industry and nonprofitfor-profit collaborations have led to the development of revised
institutional norms that accommodate new organizational
relationships. Among the most pronounced changes, which have
been documented in a number of research studies, are that secrecy
has replaced openness, privatization of knowledge has replaced
communitarian values, and the commodification of discovery has
replaced the norm that university-generated knowledge is a free
good that is part of the intellectual commons.1
* Sheldon Krimsky is professor in the Department of Urban &
Environmental Policy & Planning in the School of Arts & Sciences, and Adjunct
Professor in the Department of Family Medicine and Public Health in the School
of Medicine, Tufts University. He is the author of SCIENCE IN THE PRIVATE
INTEREST and co-editor of a forthcoming volume RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES IN THE
BIOTECH AGE.
1
See David Blumenthal et al., University-Industry Research Relationships
in Biotechnology: Implications for the University, 232 SCIENCE 1361 (June 13,
1986) (discussing study of research university faculty and the effect of industry
support for research on several issues, including secrecy); Eric G. Campbell et
al., Data Withholding in Academic Genetics: Evidence From a National Survey,
287 JAMA 473, 473 (Jan. 23, 2002) (discussing study of trend among geneticists
of withholding data from other scientists and the effects of such behavior on
research); Thomas Bodenheimer, Uneasy Alliance: Clinical Investigators and
the Pharmaceutical Industry, 342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1539 (May 18, 2000).
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The rapid growth of academic entrepreneurship has given rise
to new concerns about scientific conflict of interest, especially in
areas such as public health and medicine, in which the public has a
direct personal stake.2 Conflicts of interest among scientists, rarely
discussed prior to 1980, have been linked to research bias as well
as the loss of a socially valuable norm among academic
researchers, namely “disinterestedness.”3
It should be noted, however, that academic entrepreneurship is
not without precedent. As early as 1968, James Ridgeway
described the growth of new consulting enterprises in his book The
Closed Corporation. Ridgeway wrote that, in recent years,
professors have started a number of new kinds of companies
involved in social problem solving, so the idea that the university
is a community of scholars is a myth. Ridgeway elaborated:
Professors are a new priesthood . . . whose ideas are the
drive wheels of the Great Society; shaping our defenses,
guiding our foreign policy, redesigning our cities,
reorganizing our schools, deciding what our dollar is worth.
As power brokers, the professors act with one hand on the
university and the other on a big corporation; they move in
and out using their prestige as scholars to advance interests
of the company.4
Whereas older academic entrepreneurship concentrated on facultyformed consulting enterprises and startup companies in decision
sciences and electronics, newer academic enterprise zones have
concentrated in the biomedical sciences and medicine, where the
stakes are higher and the public’s concern about scientific integrity
is greater.5
Mainstream science is now beginning to question how conflicts
2

Marcia Angell, Is Academic Medicine for Sale?, 342 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1516 (May 18, 2000).
3
JOHN ZIMAN, REAL SCIENCE 161 (2000).
4
JAMES RIDGEWAY, THE CLOSED CORPORATION 84 (1968).
5
Susan Ehringhaus & David Korn, Conflicts of Interest in Human Subjects
Research, in ISSUES IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ONLINE, Winter 2002,
available at www.issues.org/issues/19.2/ehringhaus.htm; See also COMM. ON
GOV’T OPERATIONS, ARE SCIENTIFIC ‘MISCONDUCT’ AND CONFLICTS OF
INTEREST HAZARDOUS TO OUR HEALTH?, H.R. REP. NO. 101-688 (1990).
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of interest enter into professional activities, including publication,
peer review, government advisory committees, federal science
agencies, clinical trials, and expert testimony in the courts. Leaders
in the scientific community are not ready to jettison the idea of
“disinterested science” and “objectivity.” Donald Kennedy, editorin-chief of Science, recently wrote about the public’s growing
interest in the integrity of science: “Society is now concerned with
possible sources of bias and seeks assurance through disclosure
that the data or opinions presented are those of a disinterested
party.”6 In December 2003, the Los Angeles Times ran a series of
stories about conflicts of interest at the National Institutes of
Health (NIH) and the National Science Foundation, where highlevel scientific laboratory and program supervisors were cashing in
on patents and business connections with drug companies.7 The
L.A. Times editorial criticized NIH for becoming “an arm of
commerce.”8 The editorial described the NIH as “a place where
objective science is being trampled in a stampede for market
share” and where “scientists brazenly collect paychecks and stock
options from biomedical companies, and do so with the blessing of
their leaders.”9
These comments hardly penetrate the surface of the public ire
that has been directed at the commercialization of academic
science. Public outcry has led to litigation, congressional hearings,
dozens of investigative reports in the media, books, editorials in
science journals, and new federal policies for addressing conflicts
6

Donald Kennedy, Disclosure and Disinterest, 303 SCIENCE 14 (Jan. 2,
2004) (noting that “society is now concerned with possible sources of bias and
seeks assurance through disclosure that the data or opinions presented are those
of a disinterested party”).
7
See, e.g., David Willman, Records of Payments to NIH Staff Sought, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 9, 2003, at A12, available at 2003 WL 68903373; David Willman,
Stealth Merger: Drug Companies and Government Medical Research, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 7, 2003 at A1, available at 2003 WL 68902911; Editorial,
Subverting U.S. Health, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2003 at M4, available at 2003 WL
68903050 [hereinafter Editorial, Subverting U.S. Health]; Alan Zarembo,
Funding Studies to Suit Need, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2003 at A1, available at 2003
WL 68902206..
8
Editorial, Subverting U.S. Health, supra note 7, at M4.
9
Id.
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of interest.10 In this paper, I discuss the effects of the academic
funding structure and financial conflicts of interest on the integrity
of scientific research. Additionally, I examine the influence of
conflicts of interest on the courtroom testimony of experts and
suggest ways in which judicial and scientific methodologies can
look to each other to enhance objectivity. The central issues
underlying this analysis include whether scientific conflicts of
interests make a difference in the quality of science, whether
objectivity is threatened by the growth of scientific
entrepreneurship, whether judicial proceedings should be attentive
to conflicts of interest in expert testimony, whether disclosure is a
sufficient antidote, and whether objectivity can prevail when all
interests are transparent.
I. LAW AND SCIENCE: TWO MODELS OF EPISTEMOLOGY
It is fair to say that the judicial system and the scientific system
are both about getting to the truth. Sheila Jasanoff notes: “[T]he
ways in which truth is found in each location is through
establishing a direct correspondence with some exogenous reality:
with a legally significant event in the case of law, and with a
phenomenon of nature in the case of science.”11 However, science
and law take quite distinct structural paths to arrive at their
respective truths.
The judicial path is organized around a system of legal
advocacy. Each advocate builds an evidentiary edifice intended to
falsify or validate a causal story or a truth claim within that story.
The advocate lawyer is not expected to be balanced, self-critical, or
inclusive of all evidence, but rather to serve his or her client in the
best way possible. When a legal brief cites evidence that does not
support a client’s claim, it is usually to dispute, invalidate, or
provide a different interpretation of that evidence. The public
10

See, e.g., Eyal Press & Jennifer Washburn, The Kept University,
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, March 2000, at 39-54; Kennedy, supra note 6, at 14;
Ehringhaus & Korn, supra note 5.
11
Sheila Jasanoff, Contested Science in Legal Settings, Remarks at the
Coronado Conference “Scientific Knowledge and Public Policy” (San Diego,
CA) (March 13, 2003) (transcript available from author).
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expects that lawyers are paid by their clients to advocate for a
particular truth narrative. In fact, professional norms prohibit
lawyers from simultaneously representing competing interests.12
There are, however, important groundrules in legal epistemology.
For example, lawyers and forensic investigators cannot destroy or
manufacture evidence.13 Additionally, they must make evidence
available to others for analysis and interpretation.
The judicial model creates a decision space for an objective
review of evidence by disinterested observers who are neither
forensic investigators nor the creators of the causal narratives.
Since Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, federal judges
have played a more critical role in ascertaining the reliability of
scientists and the science presented to interpret relevant evidence.14
Within the judicial model, either the judge or jury renders a
determination regarding the truth or probability of a given causal
narrative through the use of evidentiary standards that are
determined by the nature of the litigation. Undoubtedly, financial
resources can play a role in the court’s truth determination. After a
decision has been rendered, legal advocates may pursue a reversal
of the court’s truth narrative by introducing new evidence or by
questioning the methodology or process under which the inquiry
took place.15
In science, by contrast, the operative methodological norm is

12

See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(a) (2002).
Jasanoff, supra note 11.
14
509 U.S. 579 (1993) (holding that the general acceptance of a scientific
technique is not a precondition for admission of expert testimony based upon
that technique so long as the standards of reliability and relevance under the
Federal Rules of Evidence are met). The Court, in Daubert, listed several factors
that federal judges should consider when determining the admissibility of expert
testimony. Id. at 590-97. These factors, often referred to as the Daubert test,
include whether the expert’s theory is capable of being tested; whether the
theory “has been subjected to peer review and publication”; the “known or
potential rate of error and the existence and maintenance of standards
controlling the technique’s operation”; and whether the theory has been
generally accepted by the relevant scientific community. Id. at 593-94 (internal
citations omitted).
15
FED. R. CIV. P. 59.
13
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not advocacy but “organized skepticism.”16 As early as 1937,
Robert Merton highlighted this norm as an essential component of
scientific inquiry: “Organized skepticism [sic] involves a latent
questioning of certain bases of established routine, authority,
vested procedures and the realm of the ‘sacred’ generally . . . .
Most institutions demand unqualified faith; but the institution of
science makes skepticism a virtue.”17 Scientists as a community
are expected to approach new truth claims with a critical eye
toward the limitations of evidence and the falsifiability of the
causal hypothesis. Scientists who fail to cite data that are
unfavorable to their hypotheses are viewed as negligent or biased.
Protecting the integrity of good evidence is valued, while harsh
penalties are meted out for “cooking” or tampering with data.18
In keeping with this structure of skeptical independence,
scientists who receive private funds for their work, unlike lawyers,
are not supposed to speak solo voce for the values and interests of
their sponsors. However, when private funders contract with
academic scientists, hidden covenants sometimes demand greater
fidelity to sponsors than professional standards would permit.
Consider the case of Professor Betty Dong, a pharmacologist at the
University of California at San Francisco.19 A pharmaceutical
company contacted Dong after a letter she had co-authored
appeared in a medical journal.20 The letter reported differences in
the effectiveness of various pharmaceutical drugs in treating
hypothyroidism and cited two brand name preparations as having
greater benefits than the generic drugs, which had been gaining
16

Robert Merton, Science in the Social Order, in SOCIAL THEORY AND
SOCIAL STRUCTURE 547 (Robert Merton ed., 1957).
17
Id.
18
THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, RESPONSIBLE SCIENCE: ENSURING THE
INTEGRITY OF THE RESEARCH PROCESS 2, 3 (NATIONAL ACADEMY PRESS 1992).
19
This case is discussed fully in SHELDON KRIMSKY, SCIENCE IN THE
PRIVATE INTEREST 14-18 (2003). See also Ralph T. King, Jr., Bitter Pill: How a
Drug Firm Paid for University Study, Then Undermined It, WALL ST. J., Apr.
25, 1996 at A1; Lawrence K. Altman, Drug Firm, Relenting, Allows
Unflattering Study to Appear, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1997, at Al.
20
See Miriam Shuchman, Consequences of Blowing the Whistle in Medical
Research, 132 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 1013-14 (2000).
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market share from the major brands.21 A manufacturer of one of
the leading brand name drugs signed a contract with Dong to
undertake a bioequivalency study, which the company hoped
would demonstrate that its formulation was superior to the generic
drugs on the market.22
Dong completed a double-blind study in 1990 and sent the
results to the company that sponsored it.23 Dong’s results showed
that, for the four drugs she studied, there was no difference in the
therapeutic effectiveness of the generics and the brand name
drug.24 When Dong notified the company that funded the study of
her findings, it disputed her results and indicated that her study was
flawed.25 Dong submitted a paper describing her study to the
Journal of the American Medical Association.26 It was peer
reviewed by five individuals, revised, and accepted for
publication.27 Prior to publication, Dong’s corporate sponsor
warned her that she could not publish the results of the study
without its permission because of a restrictive covenant in her
contract.28 In relevant part, the covenant stated:
All information contained in this protocol is confidential
and is to be used by the investigator only for the conduct of
this study. Data obtained by the investigator while carrying
out this study is also considered confidential and is not to
be published or otherwise released without written consent
from Flint Laboratories, Inc.29
Fearing costly litigation, Dong withdrew the article after the

21

Id.
Drummond Rennie, Editorial, Thyroid Storm, 277 JAMA 1238 (1997).
23
A double-blind study in this case means that neither the subjects nor the
researchers know which subjects received the drug and which received the
placebos and in what order the drugs were administered. Double-blind studies
are the gold standard for medical research.
24
Rennie, supra note 22, at 1238.
25
Id.
26
Id. at 1239-43.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Rennie, supra note 22, at 1239.
22
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journal had already prepared galleys of the work.30
Dong’s case attracted international attention to the question of
control over the scientific data of sponsored studies. The attorneys
general of thirty-seven states filed a class action suit against Flint
Laboratories, claiming that the company had withheld information
from the Food and Drug Administration and disseminated
misleading information about its product.31 The company agreed to
pay approximately $98 million to users of its drug.32
To date, universities continue to sign contracts with restrictive
covenants regarding the control of data and publication. A small
group of journals associated with the International Committee for
Medical Journal Editors (ICJME) has agreed that articles submitted
to the journals on the results of clinical trials should have signed
statements by authors stating that they, not the sponsors, have
control over the data.33 The editors of the ICJME journals were
quite explicit about their disapproval of restrictive covenants in
sponsored drug studies:
Such arrangements not only erode the fabric of intellectual
inquiry that has fostered so much high quality clinical
research, but also make medical journals party to potential
misrepresentation, since the published manuscript may not
reveal the extent to which the authors were powerless to
control the contact of a study that bears their names. 34

30

The paper was published years later. See Betty Dong et al.,
Bioequivalence of Generic and Brand-Name Levothyroxine Products in the
Treatment of Hypothyroidism, 277 JAMA 1205 (1997).
31
KRIMSKY, supra note 19, at 18.
32
Id.
33
Frank Davidoff et al., Sponsorship, Authorship, and Accountability, 345
NEW ENG. J. MED. 825, 825 (2001) (“As editors, we strongly oppose contractual
agreements that deny investigators the right to examine the data independently
or to submit a manuscript for publication without first obtaining the consent of
the sponsor.”).
34
Id. at 825-26. (stating “[w]e will not review or publish articles based on
studies that are conducted under conditions that allow the sponsor to have sole
control of the data or to withhold publication”).
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II. THE ROLE OF DISINTERESTEDNESS IN SCIENCE
The rejection of bias and advocacy in science is longstanding.
Sir Karl Popper, one of the leading philosophers of science of the
twentieth century, wrote that the logic of scientific discovery and
the growth of science are based on the falsification of
hypotheses.35 Scientists should not be in the business of trying to
confirm their hypotheses by consciously seeking data to support
them in the way that a prosecutor might gather evidence to prove
that a defendant is guilty. Instead, Popper argues, scientists should
hold their hypotheses to the most rigorous examination, as if the
hypothesis were a combatant and the scientist’s role was to expose
its vulnerability.36
The culture of science, however, does not generally conform to
Popper’s description of its proper role. The tension that builds
within science is not between a scientist and his hypothesis, but
among scientists as a community of skeptics who choose to
interpret the evidence differently, see flaws in a theory, or question
a methodology. The social systems of science have built incentives
for doing what Popper rails against, namely demonstrating the
truth of a hypothesis or getting positive results from an experiment.
Journals typically do not publish negative results; grants are not
usually awarded because someone failed to get a positive outcome
in an experiment; and scientific review panels do not seek out
negative results. From a psychosocial perspective, the gratification
35

KARL POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 280 (2d ed. 1968).
Popper explains:
The advance of science is not due to the fact that more and more
perpetual experiences accumulate in the course of time . . . Bold ideas,
unjustified anticipations, and speculative thought, are our only means
for interpreting nature: our only organon, our only instrument, for
grasping her. And we must hazard them to win our prize. Those among
us who are unwilling to expose their ideas to the hazard of refutation do
not take part in the scientific game.
Id.
36
Id. at 279. According to Popper, hypotheses are not to be “dogmatically
upheld. On the contrary, we try to overthrow them . . . in order to put forward, in
their stead, new unjustified and unjustifiable” hypotheses. Id.
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and rewards in science will not be the same for someone who
destroys theories and hypotheses as for someone who builds them.
Scientists are not disinterested ideal observers when it comes to
their own contributions, but rather are people with personal
interests outside of science. They may, for example, be concerned
about overpopulation or globalization. As John Ziman notes in
Real Science, “[t]here is no denying that scientific facts and
theories are produced by human beings, whose minds cannot be
completely cleansed of individual interests.”37 According to
Ziman, because science is a collective process, subjective elements
are filtered out first by the socialization of researchers and then by
the peer review process. Ultimately, it is the self-correcting
function of science that serves as a balancing force because “the
particular bias of each individual is neutralized in the collective
outcome.”38
It surely cannot be said that scientists are indifferent to the
outcome of their work on intellectual or personal grounds. After
all, science is a social system. Thus, the term “disinterestedness”
must be viewed in this context. An individual scientist might be
passionate about and even personally biased toward his theory.
However, the system of science has no special interest in a
particular theory being true or false; it only has an interest in
pursuing the truth. Individual scientists may refuse to give up their
hypotheses in light of falsifying evidence, but the social system of
science is always prepared to jettison a theory that does not
account for empirical evidence. Ziman believes that science’s
“ethos” and “established practice” help to transform scientists’
personal conflicts of interest “into a shared collective interest in the
production of reliable knowledge and in the anonymous,
institutionalized credibility of that knowledge.”39
For this transformation to occur, members of the scientific
community must ascertain the biases that enter into a scientific
investigation. They must be able to debate and reach consensus on
controversial issues of data reliability and interpretation.
37
38
39

ZIMAN, supra note 3, at 155.
Id. at 159.
Id. at 161.
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Intellectual interests of scientists are part of the published record
and consequently, can be debated in the open literature. When a
scientist has a financial interest in his or her work, however, the
instrumental value of the conflict is not part of the scientific record
and is not subject to debate. Instead, it falls outside the zone of
“organized skepticism” that is generally placed on scientific
findings. Scientists do not typically debate whether the
entrepreneurial interests of a researcher could influence the
objectivity of his published research. In many cases, these interests
are not even known to the scientific community. Thus, the norm of
“organized skepticism” does not operate on financial conflicts of
interest.
Importantly, a scientist’s entrepreneurial interests need not
affect the objectivity of his or her research. Most scientists bristle
at the allegation that their equity holdings in a company or a patent
related to the subject matter of their research affect their
objectivity, but this is an open empirical question. It is generally
understood that certain fields of academic science have been
heavily commercialized. John Ziman refers to these fields as “postacademic science” because they have much closer ties to
industry.40 In “post-academic science,” Ziman writes, “what cannot
be denied is that the academic norm of disinterestedness no longer
operates.”41 Ziman goes on to argue that the loss of individual
disinterestedness will not derail the attainment of objectivity when
the other norms are protected.42
Ziman distinguishes between cognitive objectivity and social
objectivity.43 The former refers to the true nature of physical
reality, which science is supposed to reveal. Social objectivity, by
contrast, is the public’s belief in the credibility of the knowledge
40

Id. at 67; See also John Ziman, No Conflict, NEW SCIENTIST, Oct. 4,
2003, at 34.
41
ZIMAN, supra note 3, at 174.
42
Id. Ziman explains: “The production of objective knowledge thus
depends less on genuine personal ‘disinterestedness’ than on the effective
operation of the other norms, especially the norms of communalism,
universalism and skepticism. So long as post-academic science abides by these
norms, its long-term cognitive objectivity is not in serious doubt.” Id.
43
Ziman, No Conflict, supra note 40, at 34.
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claims. As long as “organized skepticism” is well and functioning
(for example, through peer review, the self-correcting function of
science, the replication of results, etc.), a scientist’s financial
interests will not affect “cognitive objectivity.”44 However,
science’s “reputation for short-term social objectivity” and its
“hard-won reputation for a reasonable degree of impartiality,
political neutrality and fairness” suffer when scientists fail to
maintain disinterestedness.45
While the legal advocacy system has long dealt with the effect
of private, moneyed interests, the scientific epistemology is only
recently coming to terms with this factor. Of course, there are
many occasions in which company sponsors of research work
closely with academic researchers on mutually agreed upon
protocols. Companies frequently hire their own scientists who are
often very knowledgeable in the fields of pharmacology,
biochemistry, toxicology, and medicine, and who may also
understand the regulatory process for getting a drug to market
better than academic scientists. Although corporate funding may
influence research outcomes in some cases, a scientist’s financial
interest may prove irrelevant if the scientist follows the dictates of
responsible research.
The universally held norms of scientific inquiry in pursuit of
the truth make other relationships inconsequential so long as
scientists are totally and uncompromisingly invested in that
pursuit. One could argue that scientists who violate the canons of
their discipline would soon become pariahs—outcasts in their
professional circles. Whatever a scientist might gain in financial
reward, for example, is hardly worth the loss of professional
standing. If this is the case, then how do we explain tobacco
science, which funded many academic researchers and produced
volumes of questionable studies to counter the public health
mobilization against tobacco use?46
44
45

Misleading or false science is not cognitively objective.
ZIMAN, supra note 3, at 175; See also Ziman, No Conflict, supra note 40,

at 34.
46

Lisa A. Bero et al., Publication Bias and Public Health Policy on
Environmental Tobacco Smoke, 272 JAMA 133, 133-36 (1994) (studying sixtyfive symposium articles and forty-nine peer-reviewed articles concerning
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A. Manufactured Tobacco Research
If there were a poster-child for “the best science money could
buy,” it would certainly be the tobacco industry. Through tobacco
litigation and the discovery process, internal documents of
cigarette manufacturers became public and revealed a systematic
campaign to construct a science around tobacco safety while
attempting to dismiss as “junk science” findings that connect
tobacco use to excess morbidity and mortality.47
In July 2000, the World Health Organization (WHO) published
a particularly comprehensive report detailing the strategies used by
the tobacco industry to manufacture its own science.48 The report
was based largely on internal company documents released during
litigation. It showed that the science produced by tobacco funding
was the product of research by the industry’s hired staff as well as
“a variety of ostensibly independent quasi-academic, public policy,
and business organizations whose tobacco industry funding was
not disclosed.”49 The report also showed that tobacco companies
attempted to undermine the WHO by “rel[ying] heavily on
international and scientific experts with hidden financial ties to the
industry.”50
Some of the tactics used by the tobacco companies to support
their claims included placing articles in the medical literature
without revealing their support for the research; financing a large
number of studies intended to show that studies by the
International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) were flawed;
planning a series of studies, literature reviews, and scientific
conferences conducted by front organizations or consultants; and
seeking to create an ostensibly independent coalition of scientists
tobacco smoke and finding sponsorship can influence results).
47
See THOMAS ZELTNER ET AL., WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION,
TOBACCO COMPANY STRATEGIES TO UNDERMINE TOBACCO CONTROL
ACTIVITIES AT THE WORLD HEALTH AT THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION:
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS ON TOBACCO INDUSTRY DOCUMENTS
iii (2000), available at http://www.who.int/tobacco/en/who_inquiry.pdf.
48
Id.
49
Id. at 3.
50
Id.
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to criticize studies that linked tobacco to disease.51 Tobacco
companies also funded international seminars involving other
industries to develop “good epidemiological practices”—a
euphemism for changing the standards of scientific proof that
would serve cigarette manufacturers when they lobbied to prevent
increased restrictions on tobacco.52
Evidence shows that research funded by the tobacco industry
was designed as advocacy science. The so-called independent
centers created by tobacco companies to fund research on indoor
air, including studies of environmental tobacco smoke, also were
found to be producing advocacy science.53 Similarly, studies
supported by tobacco companies on the effects of nicotine or
smoking on cognitive performance invariably reported positive
effects.54 Nonetheless, there was no dearth of academic scientists,
including some at Harvard and Yale, willing to accept the funding
of the tobacco industry for scientific research that would support

51

Id. at 49-52.
Elisa K. Ong & Stanton A. Glantz, Constructing “Sound Science” and
“Good Epidemiology”: Tobacco, Lawyers, and Public Relations Firms, 91 AM.
J. PUB. HEALTH 1749-57 (2001). Phillip-Morris seized on the Chemical
Manufacturers Association (CMA) study annunciating principles for “sound
science” practices, using the public relations firms Burson-Marsteller and APCO
to legitimize their own scientific findings on the effects of tobacco. Id. at 175153. These efforts were undertaken in retaliation to the International Agency for
Research on Cancer (IARC), and their efforts to spearhead smoking restrictions
in Europe by questioning “junk-science” utilized by tobacco manufacturers. Id;
See also CHEMICAL MFRS. ASSOC., DOCUMENT NO. 2024005575/5604,
GUIDELINES FOR EPIDEMIOLOGY PRACTICES FOR OCCUPATIONAL AND ENVTL.
EPIDEMIOLOGIC RESEARCH (1991), available at http://www.pmdocs.com.
53
Deborah. E. Barnes & Lisa A. Bero, Industry-Funded Research and
Conflict of Interest: An Analysis of Research Sponsored by the Tobacco Industry
Through the Center for Indoor Air Research, 21 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 515
(1996). Much of the industry-sponsored research on environmental tobacco
smoke was later published in non-peer reviewed journals. Id. at 520-24. The
quality of those articles proved to be inferior to articles published in peerreviewed journals. Id. at 526-28.
54
Christina Turner & George J. Spilich, Research Into Smoking or Nicotine
and Human Cognitive Performance: Does the Source of Funding Make a
Difference?, 92 ADDICTION 1423, 1426 (Nov. 1997).
52
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tobacco’s interests.55
Financial interest by scientists undoubtedly affects the popular
culture’s perception of scientific reliability. However, we must
examine the effect of financial interests on science itself, not
merely the perception of this impact. This question can be explored
by investigating whether there is a funding effect in science.
Clearly, such an effect is present in “tobacco science.”56 Still, we
must consider whether the same effect appears in other sectors of
science. More importantly, we must evaluate the possible
implications of such a funding effect on the judiciary, which seeks
independent scientific expertise to guide the administration of
justice. If there is evidence that financial interests play a role in the
outcome of science, then we must question whether “conflict of
interest” is simply a problem of perception and its antidote is mere
disclosure or transparency.
B. The Funding Effect in Drug Studies
The question of whether funding affects scientific outcomes
had not been systematically studied prior to the 1990s. The reasons
are rather complex. Those who questioned the legitimacy of
science or its objectivity were largely from the new post-modernist
field of literary scholarship or the new feminist critique of science.
The former attacked the objective framework of science that
claims to find a single “text” for explaining the nature of the
universe, whereas the latter saw a gender bias in the epistemology
of science.57
By the 1990s, publicity regarding conflicts of interest,
especially in the biomedical sciences, prompted investigations into
the relationship between commercial ties and research outcomes.58
Among the most impressive of these investigations was a 1998

55

Derek Yach & Stella A. Bialous, Junking Science to Promote Tobacco,
91 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1745 (2001).
56
See infra notes 45-46 and 52-55.
57
See, e.g., SANDRA HARDING, WHOSE SCIENCE? WHOSE KNOWLEDGE?
(1991).
58
See e.g., infra Table, at 67.
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study performed by a team of Canadian researchers.59 The
Canadian team examined the degree to which industry support of
medical education and sponsorship of research influenced the
opinions and behaviors of clinicians and researchers. The team’s
study followed in the footsteps of a Canadian television
documentary that highlighted a conflict of interest between the
Health Protection Branch of Health and Welfare Canada and the
manufacturers of calcium channel antagonists (CCAs), a new
generation of drugs used for hypertension and cardiac problems.
An ongoing controversy over the safety and efficacy of CCAs
provided a natural experiment. The Canadian team sought to
determine whether commercial ties to drug manufacturers played
any role in explaining the attitudes of journal authors regarding the
risks of the drugs.
First, the Canadian research group collected journal articles
and letters to the editor on CCAs that were published between
March 1995 and September 1996.60 The group compiled seventy
usable published documents, including original research, reviews,
and letters for its study.61 Second, the group identified the authors
listed in the documents and classified them by the content of their
writings.62 The authors were categorized as critical, neutral, or
supportive of the use of CCAs.63 Third, the research group sent out
a survey to authors to learn whether they had any financial
associations with any of the forty companies that manufacture
CCAs or a competing product.64
The study confirmed the team’s hypothesis that supporters of
CCAs were more likely than others to have financial relationships
with manufacturers of this class of drugs.65 The study showed that
96 percent of authors identified as supportive had financial
59

Henry T. Stelfox et al., Conflict of Interest in the Debate Over CalciumChannel Antagonists, 338 NEW ENG. J. MED. 101 (1998).
60
Id. at 104-6.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id. Financial associations include travel support, honorarium, educational
funds, research grant, consultation, etc.
65
Stelfox, supra note 59, at 104-6.
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relationships with manufacturers of CCAs, while only 60 percent
of neutral authors and 37 percent of critical authors had such
affiliations.66 The study also demonstrated that supporters of CCAs
were more likely than other authors to have financial relationships
with any pharmaceutical manufacturer. The investigators
discovered that 100 percent of supportive authors, 67 percent of
neutral authors, and 43 percent of critical authors had relationships
with pharmaceutical manufacturers.67 The team’s hypothesis that
critics of CCAs were more likely than others to have financial
relationships with manufacturers of competing products proved
false. In fact, authors critical of CCAs were much less likely to be
financially associated with manufacturers of competing products.68
The research group concluded that there was “a strong association
between author published positions on the safety of calciumchannel antagonists and their financial relationships with
pharmaceutical manufacturers.”69 The Canadian study is one of
several studies published within the last decade that have identified
a funding effect in the biomedical sciences that could have serious
health effects on the consumer population.
One Yale University research team pooled all of the studies
available in a type of meta-analysis on the impacts of financial
conflicts of interest in biomedical research.70 Based on eleven
independent studies, the research team determined that “strong and
consistent evidence shows that industry sponsored research tends
to draw pro-industry conclusions.”71
The data from the studies tells a convincing story that
commercial affiliation of researchers has a biasing effect—not
simply on each investigator, but also on the general population of
investigators. It imposes a kind of evolutionary pressure that steers
the research toward the interests of the sponsors. This bias can
often be subtle and difficult to detect, even for veteran journal
editors. Frank Davidoff, former editor of the Annals of Internal
66
67
68
69
70
71

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Bekelman, supra note 73, at 463.
Id.
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Medicine, believes the issue is one of transparency. Recalling an
instance in which he and his staff questioned an author’s overstated
description of statistical evidence in a sponsored study, Davidoff
explained:
The problem for me was not that the trial sponsor had an
interest in how the study was conducted and reported—that
was natural enough, given its sizeable financial investment.
The problem was that details of the sponsor’s involvement
in and control over research done by ‘independent’
investigators weren’t being made known to editors,
reviewers, and readers.72
In Davidoff’s view, once the relationship between the researcher
and the corporate funder of the study has been disclosed, the
editor’s responsibility ends.73
The response doubtlessly would be far different in another
sector of our society, be it government, journalism, or law. Imagine
if a judge prefaced his remarks during the sentencing phase of a
trial by declaring that he would be sentencing the convicted felon
to time in a for-profit prison in which he, the judge, had some
72

Frank Davidoff, Between the Lines: Navigating the Uncharted Territory
of Industry-Sponsored Research, 21 HEALTH AFFAIRS 235, 236 (2002).
73
Id. at 236. Davidoff writes:
The title of the page of the study we received in 1995 made the fact of
industry support quite clear; the trial was well conducted, and the drug
it tested, potentially important. The problem lay buried in the text. It
seemed to me, my fellow editors, and our statistician that the authors
had gone well beyond the data in stating the drug’s efficacy and safety.
I suggested alternative wording that we felt was more appropriate, but
the author’s revision still contained the original wording. I tried again,
but the second revision also came back unchanged. I then called the
lead author to find out what was going on.
He made no bones about the fact that the drug company sponsoring the
research had reserved the right to review the manuscript before it was
submitted—something that had not been disclosed to us. When I
pushed him about how much control the company had over the paper’s
wording, things got a little murkier. The principal researchers had
nominally retained control, he said, but the company’s opinion did very
likely influence the report’s language.
Id.
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personal equity. Moreover, the judge rationalized that, by
augmenting his modest government salary in this way, he could
better serve the public interest and act more objectively. With this
scenario in mind, we must question whether the disclosure of
financial involvement is sufficient to protect the interests of society
and the public’s investment in university science.
III. SCIENCE AND THE JUDICIARY
What implications do issues of scientific conflict of interest
have on judicial processes? Trial lawyers choose their own experts
who must pass the Daubert test in federal courts.74 Generally, a
scientist’s financial relationship to the subject matter of his or her
research is not a matter of material concern in a Daubert hearing.
However, at trial and under cross examination, all factors affecting
the scientist’s credibility and objectivity are teased out for the jury,
including whether the expert has more than an intellectual or
professional interest in the field of knowledge he or she brings to
the court.
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, the Ninth Circuit
cited the objectivity of the expert witness as a relevant criterion
pertaining to whether the testimony was based on pre-litigation or
post-litigation science.75 The court ruled that the timing of the
research used in the testimony was relevant in applying the
Daubert criteria:
That an expert testifies based on research he has conducted
independent of the litigation provides important, objective
proof that the research comports with the dictates of good
science. For one thing, experts whose findings flow from
existing research are less likely to have been biased toward
a
particular
conclusion
by
the
promise
of
remuneration . . . .76
Still, there is no evidence that pre-litigation research is more

74
75
76

For an explanation of the Daubert test, see supra note 14.
43 F.3d. 1311 (9th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 1317 (internal citations omitted).
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dependable or objective than post-litigation research.77 As
previously indicated, however, evidence shows that private
funding of research introduces bias and compromises objectivity.78
Under Daubert, judges have a daunting task in deciding whether
expert evidence is relevant and reliable. To add “objective” to that
list would bring the court into a “hornet’s nest” of issues related to
conflict of interest and bias—forcing courts to grapple with the
link between moral purity of research and scientific epistemology.
Litigation science has financial rewards and, as such, is
considered a disclosable financial interest (except in the rare
situation where the scientist does the work pro-bono or at no cost).
However, non-litigation science may also be connected with
financial interests.79 Thus, the criterion of pre- or post-litigation
science may be less relevant than the nature of the financial
interests and the availability of evidence that such interests impair
the objectivity of the scientist.
The government’s own policies on conflicts of interest and
scientific advisory committees have been less than exemplary. For
example, consider that there are two rules that guide the
appointment of experts to federal advisory committees: (1)
scientists with substantial conflicts of interest in the subject matter
of the advisory committee should not be allowed to serve; and (2)
the first rule can be waived.80 Waivers of conflict of interest issues
can be significant, as demonstrated by a study carried out by USA
Today.81 Investigative journalists of USA Today examined eighteen
expert advisory committees established by the Food and Drug
77

See Sheila Jasanoff, Hidden Experts: Judging Science After Daubert, in
Trying Times: Science and Responsibilities After Daubert 30-47 (Vivian Weil
ed., 2001). Jasanoff states: “[T]he assumption that science is more biased if it
emerges from post-litigation than from pre-litigation remains, at the very least,
more doubtful than Kosinski’s opinion suggested.” Id. at 34.
78
See infra Table, at 67.
79
Id.
80
The Food and Drug Administration reportedly waves conflicts of interest
of up to $100,000 for members of its advisory committees. See
www.fda.gov/fda/special/newdrug/advice.html.
81
See, e.g., Anonymous, How the Study was Done, USA TODAY, Sept. 25,
2000.
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Administration’s Center for Drug Evaluation and Research
between 1998 and 2000.82 These committees make
recommendations to the FDA on drug approval. There were 159
meetings during this study period.83 At least one advisory
committee member had a financial stake in the subject under
review in 146 of the 159 meetings.84 At 50 percent of the meetings,
at least half of the advisory committee members had financial
interests in the products being evaluated.85 The study also reported
that “more than half of the experts hired to advise the government
on the safety and effectiveness of medicine have financial
relationships with the pharmaceutical companies that will be
helped or hurt by their decisions.”86
Similarly, court-appointed panels of experts charged with
advising the judiciary should also be vetted under conflict of
interest guidelines. When Judge Sam Pointer of the U.S. District
Court in Alabama accepted the appointment of Canadian
rheumatologist Dr. Peter Tugwell to review scientific claims of
disease causation in the breast implant litigation, he decided that
the candidate’s financial relationship and ongoing discussions with
two of the defendants in the case did not disqualify Dr. Tugwell
from serving on the panel.87 In his deposition, the medical expert
responded to the plaintiff’s attorney regarding his relationship with
a drug company:
Attorney: So as I understand it . . . as of January 11, 1999,
while serving on the science panel, you had entered into
two contracts with Bristol-Myers Squibb, is that correct, the
consulting contract and the contract relating to the clinical
trial?
Tugwell: Again, this connection you’re making is, in my
82

Id.
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id. See also Dennis Cauchon, FDA Advisers Tied to Industry, USA
TODAY, Sept. 25, 2000, at A1.
86
Dennis Cauchon, FDA Advisers Tied to Industry, USA TODAY, Sept. 25,
2000, at A1.
87
This case is discussed in KRIMSKY, supra note 19, at 135-39.
83
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opinion, not relevant because my involvement in the breast
silicone implant litigation is in no way related with any
discussion I had with anyone else either in Bristol-Myers
Squibb or any other company.88
In response to the plaintiff’s motion to vacate Dr. Tugwell’s
appointment to the National Science Panel because of his conflicts
of interest, Judge Pointer concluded that no conflict of interest
existed and that Dr. Tugwell had acted neutrally, objectively, and
impartially.89 In cases such as these, it is worth questioning
whether the standards for impartiality were as high for the
selection of jurors as they were for the members of the expert
panel.
The scientific community, government agencies, and scholarly
journals have largely accepted the idea that transparency is the
only meaningful and practical response to conflicts of interest. If
we apply the same concept to the judiciary, we might again
imagine a situation in which a sentencing judge discloses his
equity interest in a for-profit prison. Of course, this scenario seems
quite ridiculous and it is hard to imagine that judges, politicians,
and journalists could redeem themselves of conflicting interests by
simple disclosure.
CONCLUSION
Considering that the disclosure of conflicts of interest fails to
provide an adequate solution in the judicial setting, it follows that
mere disclosure may also prove insufficient to protect the integrity
of scientific research. In fact, evidence shows that even though the
norms and conduct of science are believed to conform to a set of
universal and inviolable principles, they are not insulated from
financial conflicts of interest. Thus, the judiciary could benefit
from an understanding of the means by which advocacy science
surreptitiously enters the courtroom and the ways in which this
88

Deposition of Dr. Peter Tugwell, Apr. 5, 1999, at 116, In re Silicone Gel
Breast Implant Products Liability Litigation, 174 F. Supp. 2d 1242 (N.D Ala.,
2001) (No. CV-92-N-10000-S).
89
KRIMSKY, supra note 19, at 138.
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science is distinct from science that is not designed to support a
predetermined financial interest.
In his dissenting opinion in the Bendectin case in 2000, Justice
Ronald Castille of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted that the
accepted methodology for studying Bendectin’s effects on the fetus
was principally supported by a drug company.90 He wrote that the
pharmaceutical company “largely created the ‘generally accepted
orthodoxy’ that would freeze out viewpoints contrary to their
litigation interests . . . [and thus] subsidized or otherwise
influenced most of the studies that concluded that Bendectin does
not cause birth defects.”91
Justice Castille correctly identified a corporate research
strategy that has been used to fund core methodologies and
develop standards of proof that support the long-term financial
interests of companies. This strategy has been used to address a
variety of scientific issues, including low dose effects, second-hand
smoke, endocrine disrupting chemicals, ambient air quality, global
warming, and even punitive damage awards by juries. For
example, in 1994, an Alaskan federal jury awarded $5.3 billion in
punitive damages to individuals who were adversely affected by
the Exxon Valdez oil tanker spill.92 Exxon funded studies by
several academic social scientists who eventually published papers
challenging the competence of juries to set punitive damages
fairly.93 Those papers were then used by Exxon to support its
appeal of the damage award.94 Several scientists who signed on
with the company declared their independence.95 According to the
L.A. Times, however, one social scientist contacted by Exxon to
90

Blum v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 764 A.2d 1, 16-17 (Pa. 2000)
(Castille, J., dissenting).
91
Id. at 16. Judge Castille wrote: “There is something not a little offensive
about an entity, creating a biased, litigation-driven scientific ‘orthodoxy,’ and
then being permitted to silence any qualified expert holding a dissenting view on
the grounds of ‘unorthodoxy’.” Id. at 17.
92
Alan Zarembo, Funding Studies to Suit Need, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2003,
at A1.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
Id.
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write an article reported that the company explicitly told him it was
looking for articles that could be used in court to argue that juries
were not competent to make punitive awards.96
There are similar cases of corporate funding of research in risk
analysis, toxicology, and epidemiology, in which financial support
is aimed at establishing baseline principles that set a high burden
of proof for demonstrating causal relationships in public and
occupational health with the hope of defining standards that will be
used in future litigation. Under Daubert, federal judges would
benefit from not only being informed about the scientific standards
of the specific disciplines from which expertise is drawn, but also
about the ways in which corporate stakeholder interests may
socially construct those standards. Given the growing evidence that
advocacy science has a potentially distorting effect on scientific
objectivity, the funding effect in science should be no less relevant
to trial judges than considerations of whether a scientific analysis
has been peer reviewed, whether a meta-analysis of data is reliable,
or whether a technique has a known error rate.

96

Id. at A1.

KRIMSKY MACROED FINAL 2-16-05.DOC

3/7/2005 3:09 PM

THE FUNDING EFFECT IN SCIENCE

67

Table 1 (“The Funding Effect in Science”)
Source Journal
Journal of
General Internal
Medicine

Focus of the Study
conflicts of interest
and research results

Journal of
General Internal
Medicine

funding and the
outcome of clinical
trials

Journal of the
American
Medical
Association

effect of research
funding in randomized
drug trials

Journal of the
American
Medical
Association

impact of financial
conflicts of interest in
biomedical research

97

Conclusion
“authors with COI were 10-20
times less likely to present
negative findings than those
without COI”97
“in no case was a therapeutic
agent manufactured by the
sponsoring company found to be
inferior to an alternative product
manufactured by another
company”98
“conclusions of trials were
significantly more likely to
recommend the experimental
drug as the treatment of choice if
trials were funded by for-profit
organizations”99
“evidence suggests that financial
ties that intertwine industry,
investigators, and academic
institutions can influence the
research process”100

Lee S. Friedman & Elihu D. Richter, Relationship Between Conflicts of
Interest and Research Results, 19 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 51, 54 (2004). The
study found this “relationship was strongest among studies investigating drug
treatments.” Id.
98
R. A. Davidson, Source of Funding and Outcome of Clinical Trials, 1 J.
GEN. INTERNAL MED. 155, 158 (1986) (concluding that studies sponsored by
pharmaceutical companies were more likely to favor the new therapy).
99
Bodil Als-Nielson et al., Association of Funding and Conclusions in
Randomized Drug Trials, 290 JAMA 921, 925 (2003).
100
Justin E. Bekelman et al., Scope and Impact of Financial Conflicts of
Interest in Biomedical Research, 289 JAMA 454, 463 (2003) (finding that
“industry-sponsored research tends to draw pro-industry conclusions”).
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Source Journal
Journal of the
American
Medical
Association

Focus of the Study
potential conflict of
interest in trials of new
oncology drugs

British Medical
Journal

randomized clinical
trials published in the
British Medical
Journal

Family Practice

randomized controlled
drug trials

Addiction

smoking or nicotine
and human cognitive
performance

101

Conclusion
“[s]tudies funded by
pharmaceutical companies were
nearly 8 times less likely to
research unfavorable qualitative
conclusions than nonprofitfunded studies and 1.4 times
more likely to reach favorable
qualitative conclusions”101
“[a]uthors’ conclusions . . .
significantly favoured
experimental interventions if
financial competing interests
were declared”102
showing “an association between
financial support of published
RCTs by commercial interests
and outcomes favouring the use
of products being tested”103
“researchers acknowledging
tobacco industry support were
considerably more likely to
arrive at a conclusion favorable
to the tobacco industry than were
researchers not acknowledging
industry support”104

Mark Friedberg et al., Evaluation of Conflict of Interest in Economic
Analyses of New Drugs Used in Oncology, 282 JAMA 1453, 1455 (1999).
102
Lisa L. Kjaergard et al., Association Between Competing Interests and
Authors’ Conclusions: Epidemiological Study of Randomized Clinical Trials
Published in the BMJ, 325 BRIT. MED. J. 249, 249 (2002) (also noting that
“[o]ther competing interests were not significantly associated with authors’
conclusions”).
103
John Yaphe et al., The Association Between Funding By Commercial
Interests and Study Outcome in Randomized Controlled Drug Trials, 18 FAMILY
PRACTICE 565, 567 (2001).
104
Christina Turner & George J. Spilich, Research into Smoking or
Nicotine and Human Cognitive Performance: Does the Source of Funding Make
a Difference?, 92 ADDICTION 1423, 1426 (1997).

